The paper proposes the use of a range of alternative measures to provide a rounded evaluation of the distributional consequences of farm income mobility, where this multifaceted approach is designed to shed light both on the extent to which farm income inequality is a short-run phenomenon due to transitory shocks rather than a chronic or persistent problem due to structural factors, and on the nature of the dynamic processes driving changes in farm income inequality over time. An illustrative empirical study of Scottish agriculture using Farm Accounts Survey data reveals that the majority of farm income inequality was structural in nature despite a substantial degree of income risk due to the volatility of agricultural incomes. Results on the micro-dynamics of inequality change have to be interpreted with caution due to the particular rules governing the assignment of farm identifiers in the survey.
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Introduction
One of the enduring goals of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been "to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture" (Treaty of Rome, 1957) , where not only the average level but also the distribution and stability of farm incomes have generally been viewed as being of policy concern (Hill, 2012). Thus successive reforms since 1992 have continued to provide income support and safety net mechanisms for producers while increasing the market orientation of the agricultural sector. The most recent reform package seeks to ensure a more equitable distribution of direct payments among countries and farmers, while also including a new reserve to secure the financial resources needed in case of crisis and a new income stabilisation tool as part of a package of risk management measures (see European Commission, 2013) .
Analyses of individual agricultural incomes typically focus either on the static distributional consequences of support (e.g. Keeney, 2000; Allanson, 2008 : Morreddu. 2011 ) or on income instability issues (e.g. Hegrenes et al., 2001; Mishra and Sandretto, 2002; Finger and El Benni, 2014) . The main aim of this paper is to explore the distributional implications of farm income mobility in Scottish agriculture and thereby address three distinct but interrelated issues. Firstly we consider the extent to which inequality is a short-run phenomenon due to transitory shocks as opposed to a chronic or persistent problem due to structural factors. Income inequality may be less of a policy concern if it is largely a transitory phenomenon such that farm incomes are equalised over the longer term. Second we seek to investigate the impact of systematic changes in the size structure of the farm sector on the observed level of inequality over time. In particular we consider whether structural changes have been distributionally neutral in relative terms, which will be the case if expected income growth rates are independent of size and therefore consistent with Gibrat's Law (Gibrat, 1931) . Finally we provide estimates of a measure of income risk based on a dynamic model of farm incomes that explicitly takes into account the impact of both transitory shocks and structural change.
The paper adds to a relatively small body of literature that makes use of longitudinal data to analyse the micro-dynamics of farm incomes. In particular, a number of previous studies (e.g. Hegrenes et al., 2001 , Meuwissen et. al., 2008 have provided evidence of considerable volatility in individual farm incomes, thereby emphasising the importance of using multiyear average data to draw meaningful conclusions about the living standards of individual farmers. We extend this work by providing complementary measures of income risk that measure transitory shocks about expected equilibrium incomes rather than about multiyear average incomes. Phimister et al. (2004) further explore the impact of the movements of farms within the income distribution on the persistence of poverty in Scottish agriculture, building on an older tradition of modelling mobility within agriculture using transition matrices (see e.g. Meuwissen et. al (2008) for a recent example).
We more broadly consider the impact of structural mobility across the whole of the income distribution using a range of methods that have been developed in the broader economics literature but not previously applied to agriculture.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides an overview of the methods that are employed to explore the distributional implications of farm income mobility. Section 3 presents the empirical study of income mobility in Scottish agriculture, which is based on an unbalanced panel of farms drawn from the Scottish Farm Accounts Survey over the production years 1995-2009. The final section concludes with a discussion of the empirical findings in the light of the most recent round of CAP reform.
Methodology
The multifaceted nature of income mobility has resulted in the emergence of several distinct strands in the literature characterising the distributional implications of the phenomenon. Jantti and Jenkins (2015) in their recent handbook article identify four main aspects of income mobility that may be of 3 normative significance: reduction of longer-term inequality, individual income growth, positional change and income risk. In this section, we outline a range of methods that allow us to capture all four of these distinct dimensions and thereby provide a rounded evaluation of the distributional consequences of farm income mobility.
Choice of inequality measure
The inequality measure used throughout the subsequent analysis is the Gini coefficient. Let () t Gy be the Gini coefficient of incomes in year t, which can be written as:
where it y is the income of individual i (i=1,….N) in year t, t y is average income, and it R is the individual's relative rank in the year t income distribution. ( 
Reduction of longer-term inequality
Income mobility may be seen to be socially desirable to the extent that it reduces inequality over the longer term. This aspect of mobility is captured by the mobility index due to Shorrocks (1978a) , which measures the extent to which equalization occurs when the measurement period is extended from one to T years:
1 In this context, farm income is treated as a size measure. As Kostov et al. (2005) point out, a wide range of different variables has been used as size measure in papers studying Gibrat's law, including farmed acreage, livestock numbers, net worth, gross sales, total gross margins and net income (Allanson, 1992; Clarke et al. 1992; and, Shapiro et al. 1987) . for the measurement period as a whole will be the same. Hence if inequality is largely a short-run phenomenon due to transitory income shocks then the index will take a value close to one whereas if inequality largely arises from long-term differences between farms then the index will take a value close to zero.
Individual income growth and positional change
The change in inequality between any two years may be decomposed into elements due to individual income growth and positional change, 2 thereby serving to characterise the nature of the transition process from the initial to the final distribution of incomes. Following Jenkins and van Kerm (2006; see also Kakwani, 1984) , the change in the Gini coefficient from some base year s to a final year f may be written as: 
is the reranking index proposed by Atkinson (1980) and Plotnick (1981) , which captures the effect of the reshuffling of individuals within the income distribution.
H M is non-negative by definition (see Lambert, 2001) , implying that any reranking that does occur has a negative impact on the overall redistributive effect of the income changes. Thus income growth will only reduce inequality if it is both pro-poor in nature and the 6 resultant vertical mobility effect is not swamped by any offsetting horizontal mobility effect due to the reranking of individuals.
Income risk and the determinants of structural inequality and vertical mobility
Interest in mobility is not only concerned with movement but also predictability, such that greater mobility may no longer be regarded as socially desirable if it is associated with more pronounced fluctuations and more uncertainty (Shorrocks, 1978a (Shorrocks, , 1978b : individuals with a preference for income stability and an aversion to risk may choose an income stream with a lower present value if it is both less volatile and more certain. From this perspective, Jantti and Jenkins (2015) For this purpose we assume the existence over time of a stable dynamic income function and specify a first-order autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model with fixed effects, which allows for both current and lagged effects of income determinants j x (j=1,…J), income persistence and individual heterogeneity: 
Income risk and the analysis of structural income inequality
We consider a measure of income risk that reflects transitory shocks about long-run or equilibrium incomes due to both equilibrium errors and contemporaneous income shocks, implicitly identifying Further information on the determinants of structural inequality may be obtained using regression-based procedures (see, e.g., Morduch and Sicular, 2002) to decompose the Gini coefficient of predicted equilibrium incomes: where this is given by the elasticity of equilibrium income with respect to that factor evaluated at the means. 9
Determinants of vertical mobility
Following Allanson and Petrie (2013), Eq.(5) may also be used to explore the determinants of vertical mobility between consecutive periods. Specifically, if f=s+1 then V M in (3) may be decomposed using (5) to yield: 
where V M is given as the sum of contributions due to changes in the J income determinants, the predicted equilibrium error and contemporaneous income shocks in (5). Each term in (10) is expressed in terms of the scale and progressivity of the income changes due to that element, with this further decomposition revealing how the average level of income changes and their distribution across base year income ranks respectively impact on vertical mobility. For example, a positive scale index j q  implies a positive average income impact due to changes in the j th income 10 determinant and if the poor enjoy a larger share of these income gains than their base year share of income then the progressivity index j P  will be negative giving rise to a reduction in inequality and hence a negative impact on V M ceteris paribus.
The interpretation of EqE P and EqE q are similar in terms of the impacts of income changes due to the process of adjustment towards the equilibrium levels of income implied by individuals' conditions in the base period, 4 where this process may generally be expected to have a negative impact on V M and hence reduce inequality. To see this point, note that the contribution of the equilibrium error to V M can be expressed as: 
where:
and which reduces to (5) if m=1 with s≡t. Hence (10) may be generalised to give:
where the^j  's,  and  are estimates of the corresponding entities in (12), with corresponding mean values ^j  's,  and  . Therefore vertical mobility in any given multiyear period is the net result of the cumulative effects of changes in income determinants over the period, the equilibrium error in the base year, and the sequence of idiosyncratic shocks to farm incomes.
Empirical analysis
We explore the distributional implication of farm income mobility in Scotland over the years 1995 to 2009 using data on an unbalanced panel of farms drawn from the Scottish Farm Accounts Survey (FAS). The study examines mobility over both the whole of the study period and, where of interest, for the two sub-periods defined by the introduction of the Single Farm Payment scheme in 2005.
Data and variable definitions
The calculate SGMs for the entire period.
Reduction of longer-term inequality
The first two columns of Table 1 
Individual income growth and positional change
The top panel of Table 2 presents The finding that expected income changes are not independent of base year incomes may be interpreted as a rejection of Gibrat's Law of proportionate effect. However this conclusion needs to be treated with some caution as the apparent progressivity of farm income growth may simply reflect regression to the mean: if individual incomes are subject to idiosyncratic shocks (or measurement errors) that are uncorrelated over time then the expected income increase of a farm with below-average income will be positive while that of farm with above-average income will be negative. We employ a number of alternative strategies to investigate whether the observed progressivity of income growth is in fact spurious.
First we consider multiyear rather than annual changes in income inequality on the assumption that extending the measurement period is likely to reduce the importance of the transitory component in any observed change. The bottom panel of Table 2 presents the results of these multiperiod decomposition analyses, which have been generated using observations on all farms present throughout the relevant measurement period. As before, we find that vertical mobility was significantly negative, with the incomes of poorer farms appearing to grow faster than richer ones even over the full study period. Nevertheless inequality rose over the first sub-period and the full period but not over the second sub-period from 2004 to 2009.
Our other two robustness checks employ income smoothing and instrumental variable (IV)
techniques to mitigate the potential for bias due to transitory shocks in the estimation of vertical mobility. First we follow common practice in the mobility literature by measuring income as a three-year centred moving average to reduce the impact of transitory variability (see, e.g. Solon, 2002) . Second, we employ the IV approach proposed by Jenkins and van Kerm (2011) to purge the rank variable of income shocks by replacing observations on ranks in the base year distribution with 16 estimates based on ranks in the distribution of the average of one year lag and lead incomes. 7 Table   3 presents the results of these alternative estimates of V M where we examine changes both over successive three year periods and the full (truncated) study period. These show that when the analysis is done using smoothed income data then income growth is still significantly pro-poor in most cases but the extent of vertical mobility is typically reduced somewhat. Conversely only two of the IV estimates of V M are significantly different from zero, one negative and one positive, which might suggest that neither poorer nor richer farms are favoured by structural developments in the industry. In conclusion, the results provide at best only weak evidence against Gibrat's law, with transitory shocks likely to account for at least some and maybe all of the observed bias of annual income growth rates in favour of poorer farms.
Income risk and the determinants of structural inequality and vertical mobility
The further analysis of mobility is based on estimates of the dynamic income model (5). OLS estimates of (5) will be biased due to the correlation between lagged income and the fixed effects in the error term (see Bond, 2002 , for a discussion). To overcome this problem we follow Mundlak Gy can each be estimated using the 'convenient regression approach' of Kakwani et al. (1997) as the response coefficient from a simple regression of a normalised measure of income on base year rank, with the suggested IV procedure intended to eliminate possible correlation between the 'explanatory' rank variable and the 'error term' in this regression. inequality, and avoids the further restriction of the sample that would result from the use of GMM estimators as these require higher-order lags of income to serve as instruments. 8
The first set of columns in Table 4 report The remainder of the Table provides results from the analysis of the determinants of equilibrium or structural inequality. On average, just over half (51.8%) of equilibrium inequality in farm incomes was due to observable differences in the size of farm businesses, as measured by economic size units: larger cropping and livestock enterprises tend to be located on farms generating higher cash incomes so the typically positive contributions of these enterprises to farm income is a source of inequality. Cropping enterprises were somewhat more unequally distributed than livestock enterprises relative to farm income in most years and therefore contribute somewhat more to equilibrium inequality than might be inferred from their relative importance in Scottish agriculture.
Income risk and the analysis of structural income inequality
This leaves the remaining half (48.2%) of structural inequality attributable to farm-level fixed effects, where these effects make a highly significant contribution in all years. This may seem a surprisingly high proportion until it is remembered what the fixed effects represent. Firstly they allow for a multitude of factors -most notably land quality, weather and managerial ability -that affect farms' financial performance but are hard to measure and therefore not explicitly controlled for in the model: empirical analyses of farm enterprise performance (e.g. Scottish Government, 2012) provide ample evidence of the considerable variation in returns achieved by Scottish farmers. 19 Secondly, they also allow for differences in workforce composition and land ownership structure between farms, which will affect farms' cash incomes but are not taken into account in the calculation of SGMs. Thus chronic inequality is as much due to differences in the cash income generating performance of farms as in their economic size as conventionally measured. First, changes in the economic size of enterprises made contributions to annual vertical mobility that were both negligible and statistically insignificant in all years. Moreover this continues to be the case even when considering vertical mobility over the entire study period.
Determinants of vertical mobility
Further investigation reveals that this is because those farms that identifiably remained in the FAS tended to be ones that did not change in size appreciably rather than because any such size changes as did occur among these farms were distributionally neutral. Thus the average growth in the economic size of farms between 1995 and 2010 is estimated to have been just 3.6% (from £54225 to £56248) based on the 151 farms that identifiably remained in the FAS throughout the entire period whereas the corresponding estimate based on the full sample is 41.7% (from £55212 to £81226). This discrepancy reflects the impossibility within FAS of tracking farms that are subject The contribution of the equilibrium error to vertical mobility is significantly negative in every year, which is consistent with our expectations based on the discussion of Eq. (11). More intuitively, adjustment towards equilibrium is equalizing since the income correction of a farm with below-equilibrium income due to a previous negative idiosyncratic shock will be positive while that of farm with above-equilibrium income will be negative. This results in income growth appearing to be pro-poor despite the lack of evidence of structural change provided by the FAS panel, with the equilibrium error accounting on average for all of the apparent progressivity of annual income changes over the period.
Finally, the contribution of the residual offsets the equalising effect of the equilibrium error in some years and reinforces it in others, though the effect is only significant in a few years and is roughly equal to zero on average over the full set of annual changes. This lack of systematic contribution to vertical mobility is to be expected given that the residual allows for the impact of idiosyncratic shocks to farm incomes after controlling for both farm-specific fixed effects and yearspecific crop and livestock enterprise slope dummies. By construction the residual is uncorrelated with lagged income over the full panel.
Conclusions
Income mobility is an inherently multidimensional concept with this paper seeking to provide a rounded evaluation of the distributional consequences of farm income mobility by considering a range of alternative measures. In particular, this multifaceted approach reveals both the temporal character of farm income inequality − whether it is a short-run phenomenon due to transitory 10 The principal objective of FAS is to monitor changes in farm performance from year to year based on an "identical sample" of farms (see, e.g., SEERAD, 2004a SEERAD, , 2004b . 21 shocks, as opposed to a chronic or persistent problem due to structural factors − and the nature of the dynamic processes driving changes in farm income inequality over time. It also highlights the trade-off between the perceived value on the one hand of the reduction of longer-term inequality due to the averaging out of transitory shocks over time and the increase in instability and risk on the other due to the unpredictability of incomes, where both phenomena may be seen to arise from the stochastic nature of the income growth process (see Allanson, 2012 , for further discussion).
The empirical analysis of farm income mobility in Scottish agriculture is based on data from the Farm Accounts Survey (FAS), which is well suited in principle to the task since farms, once The empirical results reveal that farm income inequality is partly a temporary or short-run phenomenon, with the estimates of the Shorrocks mobility and income risk indices implying that 11 In contrast, farms in the Farm Business Survey in England and Wales retain their unique number except in exceptional circumstances, such as the farm splitting into two units that both continue to participate in the survey, but even in this case the larger unit will retain the original number (cf. DEFRA, 2014) . 22 somewhere between one eighth and one quarter of inequality in annual incomes may be due to transitory shocks. Farm income instability would likely have been higher but for the substantial role played by Pillar 1 direct payments in reducing the exposure of farms to market and production risk (Tangermann, 2011; Hennessy, 2014) . The most recent CAP reform includes a new income stabilisation tool as part of a 'risk management toolkit' under Pillar 2, which would allow for the compensation of farmers who experience a severe drop in their incomes (European Commission, 2013) . However the Scottish Government (2015, p.744) has chosen not to implement this provision on the grounds that it is more appropriate for basic levels of income protection to be provided through Pillar 1 measures.
Nevertheless the overwhelming bulk of farm income inequality is shown to have been structural in nature. The subsequent decomposition analysis reveals that just over half of this longrun inequality was, on average, due to differences in the economic size of farm businesses, with the remainder due to farm-level fixed effects that represent differences in both financial performance and business structure. The move in Scotland from historic to area-based direct payments in the new CAP will inevitably redistribute support in future from farms with more intensive enterprises towards those with more extensive systems (see, e.g., Vosough Ahmadi et al., 2014) , with the Scottish Government seeking to limit the resultant scale of farm income redistribution by adopting a regionalised model in which regional payment rates reflect the productive capacity of the land (Scottish Government, 2014) . Table 2 . Bootstrapped standard errors in italics based on 1000 replications.
Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively.
